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Criminal Law Reform in Scotland 
In December 2014, the Scottish Law Commission announced the appointment of two new 
Commissioners.1 Neither of the two new appointees has particular expertise in criminal law. This 
seems likely to bring an end to the relatively constant programme of criminal work which was 
carried out under the auspices of two previous Commissioners, Patrick Layden and Gerry Maher,2 
and the Commission announced in February 2015 that it would remove the law of homicide from its 
programme of work.3 
Criminal law has featured significantly in the range of legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament 
and, given the political salience of crime and justice issues, will almost certainly continue to do so.4 
Scottish Law Commission reports have been only one source of reform proposals. The purpose of 
this brief note is to sketch some of the mechanisms which have been used to generate proposals for 
reform in recent practice, and to highlight some of the difficulties to which they give rise, particularly 
in the absence of the option of referring an issue to the Commission. 
 
A. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM WITHOUT THE LAW COMMISSION 
(a) Internal review 
Perhaps the simplest approach for the government to take is to deal with law reform in-house, 
issuing a consultation paper followed by a Bill in due course. This has the attractions of both relative 
speed and the absence of any requirement for additional expenditure. 
A current example of this approach is the consultation paper Equally Safe.5 This omnibus paper 
canvasses a number of different issues, with two proposed new criminal offences being particularly 
prominent: a specific offence of domestic abuse a new criminal offence to address so called 
“revenge porn”. This disparate group of measures is presented, somewhat creatively, as having 
arisen out of a broader Scottish strategy for combatting violence against women and girls.6 
This is not the place to discuss the merits of these proposals, but the consultation on “non-
consensual sharing of private, intimate images” highlights the limitations of the government’s 
approach here. The research basis for the proposal consists of approximately one page of text 
referring to a seemingly arbitrary selection of jurisdictions: South Australia, Queensland, Germany, 
Arizona, Delaware, New Jersey and England and Wales (appearing in that order). In all cases, 
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weblinks are provided for the relevant legislation, not always to authoritative versions. In the case of 
Germany, the reference is to an English translation of the German Strafgesetzbuch.7 Unfortunately, 
the particular section which the consultation paper quotes was deleted and replaced with a different 
provision in January of this year.8 That does not really matter, however, because the discussion of 
legislation in other jurisdictions is little more than rhetorical in nature, serving simply to show that 
other jurisdictions do in fact have an offence of this type. Almost nothing is actually drawn from the 
way in which they have constructed those offences. There is no discussion of any of the policy 
discussions which led to their creation, the principles which were thought to underpin their creation 
and scope, any difficulties which have been experienced in their implementation, or relevant 
scholarly literature of any sort. 
The consultation notes a series of questions to be considered in the formulation of any new offence, 
including whether it should be restricted to images, what type of images (if this is the formulation) 
should be covered, and the fault element that should be required. The tone is consistently one of 
caution: if expansive definitions and low thresholds of fault are adopted, then there might be cases 
which could not be prosecuted. (There is no express acknowledgment of the fact that expansive 
definitions and low thresholds of fault may lead to people being convicted for behaviour which 
should not amount to a criminal offence.) Because the consultation paper does not clearly identify 
what principles should apply in marking out the scope of criminal liability, it is difficult meaningfully 
to engage with these questions. Identifying the principles which underpin any criminal offence or 
offences9 is no mere academic flourish:10 it allows us to assess the desirability of proposed 
formulations of a possible offence. Consultation should be an attempt to refine those principles, not 
to discover them for the first time. 
(b) An investigator and reference group 
An alternative approach which has found favour in recent practice is for the government to appoint 
an individual – often, but not always, a judge – to conduct a review. Examples of this are the 
Carloway Review of criminal procedure,11 Lord Bonomy’s recently completed Post-Corroboration 
Safeguards Review,12 and John Scott QC’s review of stop and search.13 There is no fixed structure for 
these reviews, which sometimes identify the reviewer as the chair of a group of individuals with 
relevant knowledge and experience,14 and sometimes place the review in their hands personally but 
with the assistance of a similarly constituted “reference group”.15 
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In the “reference group” model, the relationship between the investigator and the group appears to 
be at the discretion of the reviewer. The reviewer may choose to take such soundings from the 
group as they feel appropriate, but to present their own views alone. When Lord Carloway gave 
evidence to the Justice Committee regarding his review, he could not answer a question from the 
convener on which members of his reference group had disagreed with his proposals on 
corroboration: “we did not have a system whereby the final report was put to the reference group 
and we noted who was in favour of one part of the report and who was in favour of the other”.16 In 
contrast, the Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review’s final report was presented as representing the 
views of the reference group as a whole, with certain members of the group including dissenting 
statements on particular points.17 
 
B. TIMESCALES 
One of the unusual features of the Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review was that Lord Bonomy 
chose to commission an academic report to inform its work. Compared to (for example) a Scottish 
Law Commission report, this was produced in a relatively short timescale, being published within six 
months.18 Despite the reference group largely delaying its work until this academic report was 
available, the Review itself reported within fourteen months of having been established, only two 
months longer than the year required for the Carloway Review.19 
Scottish Law Commission projects may take somewhat longer: for example, the review of rape and 
other sexual offences took almost three and a half years from the issue being referred to the 
Commission to a report being submitted to the Scottish Ministers.20 
There are obvious attractions to governments in being able to undertake law reform projects within 
short timescales. There are also obvious reasons why such attempts might fail. The Expert Group on 
Corporate Homicide,21 which reported within six months, is an example of this: having been told that 
there was insufficient time or resources for a literature review or research project to be carried out, 
it produced a report which was entirely unworkable and potentially created considerable difficulties 
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for the Scottish Executive,22 conveniently avoided by a decision that corporate homicide was not, 
after all, within the competence of the Scottish Parliament.23 
The Independent Advisory Group on Stop and Search has been asked to report within six months. 
Within two months of its creation, it issued a call for evidence.24 Potential respondents were 
informed that the group wanted “views, opinions and experiences” but “does not wish to be 
prescriptive by setting a series of questions for you to answer”. This seems only to put a brave face 
on the fact that, in such a short timescale, the group is unlikely to have been able to satisfy itself as 
to what the relevant questions are. It will be challenging – although certainly not impossible – for 
the group to produce within this timescale an authoritative report which can be used to build a 
consensus for reform.25 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of obvious advantages to an issue being considered by the Scottish Law 
Commission: for one, the Commission can be expected to report on the basis of a programme of 
consultation which is likely to have gone some way to building a consensus for any changes 
proposed. One difficulty with the Carloway Review’s proposal to abolish corroboration was that little 
consensus on the point of corroboration had been achieved, thus miring the Scottish Government in 
political controversy which led to the need to commission another review (that is, the Post-
Corroboration Safeguards Review) and subsequently to remove corroboration entirely from the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill.26 
The second advantage is that Commission reports will draw on both consultation and extensive 
research in order to provide considered proposals for change. The other mechanisms canvassed 
above have sometimes relied heavily on consultation to supplement rather limited research. There 
is, however, a limit to what consultation can achieve. Consultation exercises may not receive many 
responses, and it cannot be assumed that consultees will themselves have been able to carry out 
extensive research or give detailed consideration to the issues involved. Moreover, consultation is 
most effective when it takes place on the basis of considered suggestions which can be fine-tuned, 
rather than open-ended and rushed proposals. 
The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review is an example of what can be achieved here. Academic 
work provided a basis for public consultation and further consideration by the Review which was 
successful in achieving a high level of consensus across the legal profession and victims’ groups in 
respect of some controversial and sensitive issues. It is to be hoped that the government gives this 
model careful consideration when carrying out future reform exercises. 
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